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Chapter 6
The BomB PArTy 
ProBABiliTy illusion
Peter Ayton
imagine that you are invited to a party where all six guests are invited to pick a 
cracker from a bran tub. your host tells you that there are six crackers buried in 
the bran tub and that ive of the crackers each contain checks for extremely large 
sums of money but the remaining cracker contains a bomb that will kill the person 
that pulls it. his is the predicament that the characters in Graham Greene’s (1980) 
novel Doctor Fischer of Geneva or he Bomb Party ind themselves in.
Fascinated by the seemingly limitless greed of the rich, Dr. Fischer, who had 
made a fortune by inventing a toothpaste, invites extremely wealthy guests to a se-
ries of dinner parties where he derives huge amusement from observing that they 
appear consistently willing to sufer all manner of indignities in order to receive 
expensive presents that they, being so rich, could easily aford to buy for them-
selves. he bomb party is his inal ultimate test of the greed that, so far, had proved 
greater than any humiliation he had been able to invent.
on a previous occasion the guests had been obliged – on pain of forfeiting their 
presents – to consume two servings of unsweetened cold porridge. on another 
occasion they were presented with live lobsters and bowls of boiling water – each 
guest had to catch and cook a lobster. he horriic details of another dinner are, 
somewhat ominously, only hinted at: one guest refers to it as the “quail party” and 
admits it rather upset another of the guests who was very attached to birds.
he presents are usually tailored to each guest and are worth a substantial 
amount of money. however, the rules include complete submission to the hu-
miliations of Dr. Fischer, which always include barbed verbal taunts that focus 
on each guest’s failings or insecurities. sometimes the prize will also turn out to 
be a humiliation – thus at one dinner a particularly vain guest receives a framed 
photograph of himself; at another dinner mr. Kips – who sufered a physical dis-
ability – receives a leather-bound copy of a cartoon book depicting mr. Kips as the 
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main character, and cruelly mocking his aliction, that Dr. Fischer had specially 
commissioned to be produced and also arranged to be published.
it is easy to see Dr. Fischer’s dinner parties as behavioral experiments – indeed 
Dr. Fischer even refers to the dinners as experiments and the whole enterprise as 
“research”. he guests are the experimental subjects who are invited to engage in 
humiliating activities in order to establish a measure of their valuation of their 
avarice – or, more neutrally, their willingness to pay for the incentives.
At the bomb party one guest, monsieur Belmont, shocked by what he has been 
told, says that if anyone were to be killed then it would be murder. But Doctor 
Fischer argues that it would not be murder – or even suicide – but more like rus-
sian roulette. he adds that anyone who does not wish to play must leave at once. 
At this point another guest, mr. Kips, announces that he will not play and prepares 
to leave. in spite of Doctor Fischer telling him that there are ive chances to one in 
his favour, mr. Kips departs saying that he considers gambling for money highly 
immoral.
hen one of the ive remaining guests stands and, while pausing to gather cour-
age to approach the barrel is beaten to it by another – an American woman with 
blue hair called mrs. montgomery – who yells, “ladies irst,” runs to the barrel 
and pulls a cracker. A check for two million swiss francs pops out. Greene writes: 
“… Perhaps she had calculated that the odds would never be as favorable again. 
Belmont had probably been thinking along the same lines, for he protested, ‘We 
should have drawn for turns.’” Belmont presumably felt cheated because, as now 
there are only ive crackers let, the chance of being blown up is increased to one 
ith – whereas before it was one sixth.
nonetheless, ater hesitating, Belmont pulls a cracker, and also gets a check. 
Greene writes: “he had calculated the odds – he had been right to bet.” however, 
the odds on being destroyed by the next cracker have increased to one quarter caus-
ing further consternation among those yet to take their turn. Dr. Fischer teases the 
remaining guests, warning them that the odds are narrowing on their survival.
he story continues: “‘What about you Jones?’ Doctor Fischer said. ‘he odds 
are narrowing.’
“‘i prefer to watch your damned experiment to the end. Greed is winning isn’t it?’
“‘if you watch you must eventually play – or leave like mr. Kips.’
“‘oh i’ll play i promise you that. i’ll bet on the last cracker. hat gives better 
odds to the Divisionaire.’”
(Jones has been contemplating suicide for several days and also pities the Divi-
sionaire, who, despite his high military rank, has never heard a shot ired in anger 
and has been cruelly taunted by Doctor Fischer for having no record of any act of 
bravery. earlier in the story the Divisionaire had complained that he still bore the 
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scar from when a lobster nipped his inger at the lobster party. According to Dr. 
Fischer this was the only wound in action the Divisionaire ever received.)
hen the third cracker is pulled by another guest and also turns out to contain 
two million francs. his leaves three crackers and two guests, Jones and the Di-
visionaire. Jones tries to encourage the Divisionaire, telling him: “i suggest you 
go irst, Divisionaire. i’m not in need of money and it gives you the better odds.” 
Doctor Fischer tells the Divisionaire: “if you act quickly the odds are two to one 
in your favour.” however the Divisionaire realizes that he is too afraid – too co-
wardly – to take the risk: “i haven’t the courage. i should have gone to the barrel 
irst, when the odds were better.”
he comments of the characters at the bomb party imply that the longer you 
wait your turn to pull a cracker the more dangerous the risk becomes. is this cor-
rect reasoning? What can be done to maximize the chances of winning two mil-
lion francs while at the same time minimizing the possibility of being blown up?
While Doctor Fischer is correct when he says that the odds on winning are nar-
rowing ater the irst two crackers have been pulled, this is conditional on neither 
of them containing the bomb. if the bomb had been detonated by the irst guest 
to take the risk, the others could have pulled the remaining crackers secure in the 
knowledge that they would beneit inancially rather than be exploded. he longer 
you wait your turn the odds on survival shorten providing the bomb cracker is not 
pulled. however, a direct corollary is that the longer you wait the more likely it is 
that someone else will pull the cracker before you.
Doctor Fischer and his guests appear not to have taken this into account in 
their reasoning. he irst guest has a 1/6 chance of pulling the lethal cracker and a 
5/6 chance of surviving. Before the irst guest pulls her cracker, the second guest 
has a 1/5 chance of survival if the irst guest does not blow up; the chance of the 
second guest surviving are therefore 1/5 x 5/6 = 1/6. similarly the chances for the 
third guest are 1/4 x 4/5 x 5/6 = 1/6. in fact, for any number of guests drawing any 
number of crackers in which any numbers of bombs have been concealed, the po-
sition of a guest in the queue does not afect the probability of survival.
We decided to carry out some investigations to try to establish the extent to 
which the reasoning shown in the novel might be prevalent in others.
sTuDy 1: PerCePTions oF The BomB PArTy
how beguiling is the notion that there is something to be gained by choosing a 
particular position in the queue? We investigated this with a short questionnaire 
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describing the situation to a group of 77 psychology undergraduates and asking 
them to imagine that they were guests at a bomb party before any crackers had 
been pulled. our description of the bomb party deliberately tried to re-create the 
situationdescribed in the novel:
In The Bomb Party by Graham Greene, Dr. Fischer tests the greed of his six dinner 
party guests by inviting them to draw a cracker from a barrel and pull it. He tells 
them that five of the crackers contain checks for two million Swiss francs but the 
other contains a bomb. If they pull a cracker with a check they can keep the 
money, but if they pull a cracker with a bomb their life will end.
 All of the guests agree to play and promise to pull a cracker but they start to 
argue about who should go first. Then one guest suddenly rushes to the barrel, 
pulls out a cracker, pulls it, and gets a check.
 One guest complains that now the odds are worse. Originally there was a 1/6 
chance of blowing up, now it is 1/5. Then another guest pulls a cracker and gets 
a check. Now there are only four crackers left making a 1/4 chance of blowing 
up.
 Imagine you are a guest who has agreed to play at a similar party, before any 
crackers have been pulled.
he questionnaire then irst asked respondents which position at the bomb party 
they would prefer and why, and then, which has the best chance of surviving.
Table 6.1. Percentage of Responses to Each Position at the Bomb Party (Study 1)





Would you rather 
go 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 
5th or last? 40 % 12 % 4 % 0 % 0 % 42 % 3 % – – –
Which has the 
best chance of 
surviving? 48 % 0 % 3 % 0 % 0 % 19 % – 23 % 4 % 3 %
As the responses shown in table 6.1 indicate, this study conirms that the illu-
sion of an advantage in going irst is held by many subjects; last is also a popular 
choice but the bottom row of the table shows that only a minority (23 %) correctly 
airms that all positions are equally likely to draw the bomb. Almost half of the 
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respondents thought that the irst position ofered the best chance while nearly a 
ith thought that the last position was best.
here are also preferences for which position respondents would like to take 
at the bomb party which, somewhat curiously, do not quite accord with the per-
ceptions of the position with the best chance of survival. For example, more than 
twice as many respondents want to go last (42 %) than believe that last ofers the 
best chance for survival (19 %); fewer people want to go irst (40 %) than see irst 
as ofering the best chance (48 %), and 12 % of respondents wanted to go second 
even though no-one thought that had the best chance of survival. only 3 % of 
subjects said that they had no preference for a particular position in the queue.
he questionnaire also included an open-ended question that asked respondents 
to explain why they had chosen the position that they did. his enabled some scru-
tiny of the reasons underlying the diferent choices. Although irst and last positions 
are roughly equally popular choices, diferent justiications were ofered for each. 
When asked why they had chosen as they had, a common reason for those who 
preferred to go irst was that they had a better chance of surviving. however, this 
was not a common reason for those who said that they preferred to go last. hose 
choosing to go last mentioned two main arguments. one was that if the bomb had 
not gone of, they would always refuse to actually pull a cracker and therefore they 
could guarantee their survival. he other common reason was that going last would 
ensure that one knew one’s fate – you would know what would happen to you be-
fore you pulled the cracker. note though that this defense overlooks the fact that 
you wouldn’t know what happened to you until other guests pulled their crackers 
– though it highlights that the perceived utility of each position may not be the same 
and this may inluence probability judgments for each position. A few (12 %) of 
respondents wanted to go second even though no-one thought that this ofered the 
best chance of survival. Among those who chose to go second a common rationale 
was that they didn’t have the courage to go irst, but a 1/5 chance was still quite good.
sTuDy 2: A DeTerrenT For runninG AWAy
To avoid subjects feeling that they could increase their chances of surviving by go-
ing last and then running away if a cracker hadn’t exploded, we conducted another 
study on 70 more psychology undergraduates, none of whom had participated in 
study 1. he study was identical to study 1 except that this time the questionnaire 
scenario added the sentence: “you must pull a cracker (Dr. Fischer will shoot any-
one trying to run away).”
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Table 6.2. Percentage of Responses to Each Position at the Bomb Party (Study 2)





Would you rather 
go 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 
4th, 5th or last? 50 % 4 % 1 % 0 % 1 % 33 % 12 % – – –
Which has the 
best chance of 
surviving? 41 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 17 % – 33 % 7 % 1 %
he results are very similar to those for study 1 except that now the last position 
is, understandably, somewhat less popular. A rather larger proportion of subjects 
now correctly airm that the chances of survival are equal for all positions but this 
is still a minority of respondents.
sTuDy 3: resPonses To A FrequenTisT BomB 
PArTy
Gigerenzer (e.g., 1994) and Gigerenzer and hofrage (1995) argue that the diicul-
ties that people have with probabilities vanish when they are invited to consider 
probability in terms of frequency. According to this argument people are not very 
well adapted to reasoning about the relative likelihood of single events, but they 
can deal efectively with uncertainty when invited to consider it in terms of natural 
frequencies.
To explore this notion in the context of the bomb party, we developed a fre-
quentist version of the bomb party. subjects were told (ater completing the 
original questionnaire used in study 1) that Dr. Fischer had, over the years, held 
many bomb parties and that he had kept careful records of the numbers of people 
that had exploded in each position in the queue. subjects then saw six diferent 
graphical representations of the possible accumulated distributions of outcome 
and asked to select the graph that would be most like Dr. Fischer’s (see igure 
6.1). Finally subjects were asked to think again about which position they thought 
would have the best chance of surviving if they were at a bomb party.
Table 6.3 shows that the initial presentation of the bomb party (as in study 1) 
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produces very similar results to those in studies 1 and 2. he popular positions 
are irst and last and a minority of subjects (26 %) considers that all positions are 
equally likely to survive prior to subjects contemplating the frequency distribu-
tions; 41 % think that the irst person has the best chance to survive and 27 % 
think the last person is best placed. on viewing the frequency graphs, few subjects 
(11 %) chose the uniform distribution (41 % chose e; 22 % chose F).
he efects of contemplating the graphs were modest; although 11 % fewer sub-
jects thought that irst position was best, there was only a slight increase in the 
numbers perceiving that all positions were equally likely to survive (from 26 % 
to 30 %). Krauss and Wang (2003) also reported diiculties in debiasing people’s 
illusions with a frequency version of the monty hall problem – only combining 
of interventions produced a signiicant improvement – as with the present study, 
they only obtained modest efects of individual variations.
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Figure 6.1. Possible Frequency Distributions for Dr. Fischer’s Bomb Parties as Pre-
sented to Participants in Study 3.
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Table 6.3. Percentage of Responses to Each Position at the Bomb Party





Would you rather go 
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th 
or last?
46 % 9 % 1 % 0 % 1 % 38 % 4 % – – –
Which has the best 
chance of surviving?
41 % 1 % 1 % 0 % 0 % 27 % – 26 % 2 % 1 %
Which has the best 
chance of surviving? 
(After selecting 
frequency graph)
30 % 1 % 3 % 1 % 2 % 29 % 30 % 4 % 0 %
WhAT is The CAuse oF The eFFeCT?
Given the evidence for the misconception, the question arises as to its cause. one 
possibility is that the description of the problem engenders a kind of misunder-
standing. our description of the problem asks subjects to consider which position 
they would prefer and which has the best chance of survival before any crackers are 
pulled. however one possibility is that subjects assume that the experimenter is 
asking them which they would prefer – a party where no bomb has exploded and 
there are 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 or 1 cracker let. in this case the probabilities are 1/6; 1/5; 1/4; 
1/3; 1/2 and 1. Although the text of the problem does not encourage or, strictly, 
permit this representation, given that there might well be a tendency to focus on 
the situation where you are actually pulling your cracker, subjects might perceive 
the problem in this way.
Another possibility resulting in the same perception is that subjects fail to con-
sider the possibility of the bomb exploding early in the sequence. Konold (1989) 
has suggested that when reasoning with uncertainty, people tend to be outcome 
oriented and convert probabilities into yes or no. Probabilities greater than 50 % 
are assumed to refer to events that occur and probabilities less than 50 % refer to 
events that will not occur. 50/50 chances are interpreted as “don’t know.” if peo-
ple do reason in this way then they might be able to perceive the bomb party as 
a gradual escalation of risk. his also suggests that if subjects were told about a 
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bomb party in which there were a much larger number – say 100 crackers – and 
only one bomb, they might ind the illusion even more compelling. he chances of 
the irst cracker exploding are very small and yet the chances for the next person 
would clearly be worse if it does not do so.
in this respect the bomb party illusion bears some similarity with one expla-
nation of the so-called surprise test paradox (see margalit & Bar-hillel, 1983). 
he surprise test paradox emerges when a teacher tells her class that they will 
have a surprise test one day next week. he pupils go home feeling miserable until 
one pupil explains that it cannot happen. he pupil explains that the surprise test 
couldn’t happen on a Friday as they would know on hursday night, if the test 
hadn’t already happened, that it would have to be the next day and so couldn’t be a 
surprise. hence the last day the test could be is hursday. however, knowing this 
the students would know on Wednesday night, if it hadn’t already occurred, that 
the test was going to be on hursday and hence it couldn’t be on hursday either. 
Applying this logic the pupils satisfy themselves that the test cannot occur on any 
day next week and then are doubly astonished when the test happens on Tuesday 
– both by the occurrence of the test and the palpable fact that they could indeed 
be surprised!
quine (1953) has ofered an explanation of this paradox in terms of neglect 
of the possibility that the test has already occurred. in the surprise test paradox, 
people seem to reason conditionally backwards from the end of the week but, 
overlooking the possibility that the critical event could have occurred earlier in 
the week, they thereby require it to occur later. he bomb party also sees people 
apparently reasoning conditionally – though here people are reasoning forwards 
in time – but also apparently inding it easy to overlook the possibility that the 
critical event has occurred earlier in time. in each case there seems to be a prob-
lem with inding a particular scenario so alluring that it becomes diicult to con-
sider alternatives.
Although the bomb party illusion may have similarities with the surprise test 
paradox, it can be distinguished from some other notoriously illusory probability 
problems. in the three prisoner problem (Falk, 1992), Tom, Dick and harry are 
imprisoned in separate cells awaiting execution. one of them has been pardoned 
by a lottery but none of them knows which. he warden is forbidden to tell any 
of them of their fate. Dick argues that at least one of Tom and harry must be 
executed and convinces the warden that by naming one of them he will not be 
violating his instructions. he warden names harry. Dick immediately cheers up, 
reasoning: “Before, my chances of a pardon were 1/3; now only Tom and myself 
are candidates for a pardon, and since we are both equally likely to receive it, my 
chances of being freed have increased from 1/3 to 1/2.” A paradox arises because if 
Perspectives on Thinking.indd   84 17.10.11   12.03
  Chapter 6  he Bomb Party Probability illusion 85
the warder had named Tom the same conclusion could have been drawn – in fact 
merely imagining the conversation could lead to this conclusion; indeed, one need 
only merely imagine the existence of the warder to come to the same conclusion. 
in fact, Dick’s chances are unchanged at 1/3 – but Tom’s are improved to 2/3.
he monty hall problem – a better known isomorph of the three prisoner prob-
lem (see rosenhouse, 2009) – ofers game show contestants a choice of opening 
three doors to win a prize. Behind one is a sports car; behind each of the other two 
is a goat. Ater the contestant has chosen one door, monty always opens one of the 
other doors to reveal a goat. he then asks if the contestant would like to change 
their mind. should the contestant stick or switch? he counterintuitive answer is 
that the contestant should switch because their original choice of door only has a 
1/3 chance of revealing the car whereas the other unopened door has a 2/3 chance.
he diiculties that these two problems causes have been attributed to the op-
eration of “subjective theorems” (cf. shimojo & ichikawa, 1989) or heuristics. one 
suggestion is that people overuse or misapply a uniformity heuristic (Falk & lann, 
2008) to probability problems. he uniformity heuristic efectively assumes that 
when there are a number of uncertain alternatives, one should, in the absence of 
indications to the contrary, assume that they are all equally likely. he idea can 
be seen in writings by leibniz (1678) and laplace (1776) and seems to be at the 
heart of numerous other probability problems (see Falk & lann, 2008). however, 
the bomb party illusion is distinct from the fallacies triggered in these problems. 
he bomb party illusion violates the uniformity principle inasmuch as people er-
roneously believe that the set of alternatives identiied are not equally likely when 
they are – quite the opposite to the typical error made with the three prisoners and 
monty hall problems.
A number of every day events follow the bomb party pattern of serially sam-
pling without replacement. When waiting for a bus, one is entitled to believe that 
it is more likely to arrive in the next ive minutes if it didn’t arrive in the previous 
ive minutes (see Teigen & Keren (2007) for evidence that people fail to reason ap-
propriately about such situations). however, if it is late at night, i may also start to 
feel that with every passing minute it is more likely that i have missed the last bus. 
similarly when i am looking for a lost paper on my desk i may feel that i am more 
likely to ind it as i proceed. however, where there is a possibility that the paper is 
not there i may also increasingly feel that i am searching in vain.
Falk, lipson, and Konold (1994) investigated people’s reasoning about such 
situations and found that only about a ith of their subjects correctly divined that 
short term hope should increase as long term hope declines. For example, accord-
ing to Falk et al. (1994), marriage patterns in several societies are such that, for 
individuals between 18 and 30, although their long term probability of ever get-
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ting married decreases with every passing year, their short-term probabilities of 
marrying within the next six months continue to rise. if people have schemas for 
such serial searches with the possibility of failure, then might subjects be confus-
ing the long-term and short term probabilities in these common situations when 
they come to reason about the bomb party?
Before conducting the empirical studies described here i wrote a short article 
(Ayton & mcClelland, 1987) that discussed the illusion and also commented on 
Graham Greene’s autobiographical description of his own experiences playing 
russian roulette which also evidences misconceptions of probability, and may 
well have been an inspiration for his later novel. i sent the article to him and to 
my amazement received a letter in reply which acknowledged receipt of the article 
and said: “it amused me, but i am afraid it is far too mathematical for me to follow.”
it is now too late to remedy my failure to explain the illusion to Graham Greene 
but i still have hope that future studies will provide insight into the causes of and 
remedies for the bomb party illusion.
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